Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

would like to join you in welcoming Deputy Secretary of State

Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to this committee.

I look forward to their testimony and reviewing with them

Afghanistan’s prospects for the future.

I am hopeful that we are witnessing the emergence of a free and

stable Afghanistan from more than two decades of war and instability,

but it is clear that at least for the foreseeable future, Afghanistan’s

evolution will be marked by both advances and setbacks.

And since the commencement of offensive military operations

in Afghanistan, I have urged the administration to think si-

multaneously about what steps will be necessary to rebuild the nation

after the Taliban and al-Qaeda were removed.

I was pleased that, early on, President Bush stated that the

United States would, and I quote, ‘‘Not just simply leave after the

military objective has been achieved.’’ The administration correctly

recognized that, without providing the people of Afghanistan with

an environment in which the construction of a democracy and market-

based economy was not only possible, but likely, the country

would remain a source of insecurity and terror.

The United States’ international efforts have permitted the people

of Afghanistan to begin rebuilding their economy, their government,

and personal liberties, and I applaud the role that the international

coalition has played in carrying out the reconstruction efforts,

and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately,

despite this strong record of success, the future of Afghanistan remains

uncertain. Without a strong international commitment to

the reformation of a representative and effective government, our efforts could go to waste.

The loya jirga recently completed its work, selected Hamid

Karzai to be President. Karzai continues to construct a broad-based

representational government to rule Afghanistan. Pundits here in

Washington and around the world are debating the criteria employed

in selecting cabinet members of the new government, and

it is clear to most that the current security situation in Afghanistan

was the primary determination in the selection process.

I am supportive of efforts underway to expand training and equip

a new Afghan national army. A successful transformation is one of

the most important elements of long-term security, but in the

meantime I continue to be concerned that the International Security

Assistance Force, ISAF, may not be up to the task of ensuring

the requisite amount of security for Afghan reconstruction to continue.

The ability of ISAF to maintain peace and security, and to

project power into the farthest region of Afghanistan, is vitally important

if the international community is to assist Karzai in enforcing

the rule of law, and defending the threat posed by extremists,

warlords, and terrorists. Only then can we replace Afghanistan’s

despair with a genuine future of hope.

Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts have benefited, for the moment,

from the capture of major al-Qaeda operatives as well as the

dispersal of other major players around the world. Their likely

strategy is to prepare and to undertake suicidal attacks against

Western and Jewish targets, especially in Arab states allied with

the West, while larger operations are prepared for the United

States, such as the so-called ‘‘dirty bomb’’ plots.

Though relatively small and widely dispersed, the al-Qaeda

strikes appear to be coordinated by a senior group of leaders. In

short, al-Qaeda’s command structure may have survived the United

States’ military campaign in Afghanistan, even though its base in the country was eliminated.

Instances like the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue and French

and American targets in Karachi do not have the profile or drama

of past military clashes in Afghanistan, but al-Qaeda attacks are

likely to occur at any time and almost anywhere, including Afghan-

istan. Countering them has become as much a task for police and

intelligence as a military operation. Help from other governments,

especially in the Islamic world, is vital, as is effective monitoring

of potential targets, including infrastructure and weapon sources.

We know that a substantial number of al-Qaeda operatives managed

to escape Afghanistan, and travel undetected, at least, at

first, to countries around the region. We also believe a substantial

number will look for opportunities to infiltrate back into Afghanistan.

Most seriously, the alleged plot involving Jose Padilla, the alleged

al-Qaeda recruit arrested in Chicago, has the evidence that

al-Qaeda is determined to strike with weapons of mass destruction,

and is actively seeking to procure or steal them.

It is that concern that has led a number of us to recommend to

the Bush administration that the United States formulate a new

global coalition designed to keep nuclear and bioweapons out of the

hands of al-Qaeda and other terrorists. In short, Afghanistan is not

out of the woods yet, any more than terrorist threats to the United

States involving weapons of mass destruction have lessened since September 11.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the United

States can assist in bridging the gap in ISAF’s abilities and capabilities,

and the threats posed to Karzai’s young and still fragile

government, even as the Bush administration focuses on preventing

terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As both of you

mentioned, the work of our military has been tremendous, and almost

semi-miraculous from a standing start, as Secretary

Wolfowitz said. General Franks only started the planning on September

20, that part of the situation was unavoidable, but we

quickly picked up our pace and succeeded.

What is occurring now, it seems to me, does not necessarily have

to be improvised in the same way, but I have a sense that it is

being improvised. Let me review items that you both have discussed

as objectives. One is democracy building respect for human

rights educational opportunities, and economic assistance. We hope

the latter leads to at least a reasonable economy, even if not a vibrant

economy, as is often mentioned as the goal. It is not clear to

me how much of that is occurring in Afghanistan; but some may, and probably a lot should.

There must be a security framework around, so that as the democracy,

the economy, and public diplomacy begin to work, it does

not fall part at the fringes, outside of Kabul at the country’s extremities.

Likewise, how this fits with what we are doing. Do we

have a plan or plans for Pakistan? Our commitments there are

very substantial, or at least have been implied that way. Similsrly

what are our commitments in Tajikstan, Uzbekistan and other countries nearby.

My hope would be that at some point the administration would

be able to provide, if not a book, at least a report as to how all of

this is likely to be achieved over the course of an intermediate period

of time. What I think we are getting, essentially, are reports

of very commendable activities, but I do not have a confident sense

of exactly where all of this leads, except that we are hopeful for the best.

In part, there has to be improvisation. We have the 18 members

of ISAF, and they have their own agendas, although they are coincident

by and large with ours. We are committed, as Secretary

Wolfowitz said, not to become bogged down, and there is a lot of

thoughtfulness about how you do this without becoming bogged

down. Likewise, how do we run military operations, the cleanup

situation, or the activities at the border, even as we try to establish peace.

Can either one of you give some idea as to what the thinking is

in the administration pulling together State, Defense, Treasury, et

cetera, and in some coherent plan that all of us could understand

and support give some idea of what kind of financial commitments

are required, not just for this year, but for several years down the trail?

Well, that would be very helpful, because the letter

apparently would be the plan.

Senator LUGAR It would illustrate the necessary elements that

are important in all of this, and have money attached to it. That

is important in giving us some idea of where we are headed in all this.

Having said that, you mentioned you have an employee devoted

to democracy and one devoted to human rights. Granted, the State

Department might not have resources for more people there, but

organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy, or others

can be engaged. We must utilize all the tools at our disposal.

It is extremely important, in terms of our national security, that

Afghanistan be a success, so that there is, in the Muslim world, a success?

In other words, the overall public diplomacy message that keeps

coming to us is that polls of countries indicate people do not like

us, and in some cases, that understates it. To what extent does success

in Afghanistan help turn that around, offer a model of a better

life for people, that represents our ideals and our country?

Thank you for those specific suggestions; we appreciate it.

Senator Biden is temporarily out of

the room, and has asked that I preside temporarily, and in that

role, I recognize Senator Nelson.

Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Allen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was interested in

your support of Senator Hyde’s Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

I will look at his bill and see what he has done. It may help satisfy

the question I raised with the first panel, and that is, is there an

overall plan that lays out a course of action, at least one that is

coherent enough for us as lay people to read and understand? Secretary

Armitage said that he would send a letter outlining these

elements, and he went through a number of prerequisites. So there

may be something there, but I am not sure, and that is why I have

asked the question. Now you are suggesting that this legislation,

may serve a similar purpose as the Freedom Support Act did at the

time of the fall of the Soviet Union. This might be helpful in laying

out a strategy and a plan.

I would like to see a small book, and maybe this would be just

for my own edification, in which we recite the very important history

of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a sovereign state, unlike Palestine,

or other states we are talking about at the current time.

Afghanistan seemingly governed itself reasonably well for much

of this century before disruptions occurred. So that is encouraging

as a background. Because most of us hearing all the testimony and

the current events see a chaotic situation of near anarchy, of warlords

at each other’s throats. There is almost denial of the central

government, and you are saying that was not always the case, and

that there at least is some experience in this area, and the question

is how you get back to that.

Now, if we did get back to that, without knowing the history of

the country, my guess is that our expectations would be greater for

the people of Afghanistan. We have discussed the role of women,

democracy, freedom, education, health, and so forth. It is clear we

must help establish standards well beyond those that existed in the

1930s. This will require assistance, economic assistance, technical

assistance, and that must be part of the plan, and an Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

The problem with the former Soviet Freedom Support Act was

that ultimately most of the pieces sort of fell off the wagon, because

there was lack of support in Russia. The institutions there were so

forbidding that even though we were talking about agricultural reform,

they were not, and we are still discussing this in a rudimentary

way today. So even here, it is not skepticism, but some

sense of limitation as to how much occurs how fast. I ask this question as a preface.

Clearly, there is a debate going on in our administration on how

involved we should be in Afghanistan. It started with the war, and

the thought was that our role should be limited to the fewest people,

helicopters, et cetera, instead we hoped to rely upon Afghans

on the ground, and others. This phobia may be well-founded, in the

past others had got bogged down, and we would not. So that is the

way we fought it, and it was successful. It was remarkable.

Now, the problem of governance after all this is a different sort

of issue. And the feeling is, still, you might get bogged down almost

in the same way, caught between warlords and ethnic leaders.

Many feel this is untenable, and would not be supported by the

American people for very long. Therefore, you keep walking around

the problem and studying it to determine how can you do this with

the least number of people on the ground, maybe even money?

I am trying to come to grips with how we move beyond that. I

share the chairman’s anxiety in many ways, that somehow or other

the Marshall Plan idea, the President’s commitment, all these

things have been enunciated in a fairly bold way. But I am still

looking for the plan, and a structure of how this occurs, and some

dollar amounts attached to it, with numbers of American military

forces as well as diplomatic presence in conjunction with allied contributions

necessary to accomplish our goals.

I applaud each of those three steps, because I

think that is really the heart of the strategy, to begin with, and not

improvisation with funds, and which somehow you—there is something

from some other account, which we cannot possibly follow, as

you say, it was already there, maybe. It would be hard for us to

be bookkeepers. There just is not a discreet plan, or financing, or

coordination, so I really appreciate those answers, because they are

really a rifle shot, it seems to me what we ought to be about in

our questioning and our oversight.